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Analyzing the Anglo-Dutch Wars - Part 1
Analyzing the Anglo-Dutch Wars - Part 2

Opinion / Analysis

Analyzing the Anglo-Dutch Wars - Part 1
James C. Bender
August 3, 2003

We are still pursuing the goal of being able to compare the English and Dutch fleets, starting with the First Dutch War. Our prejudice would be to use "gross tonnage" as well as broadside weight. We suspect that estimating displacements, ala Jan Glete, would be a fairer comparison for "bulk". Jan Glete's work has become an important influence on our analysis.

The Dutch admirals, following the Battle of the Kentish Knock, believed that what they needed were much larger ships, armed with at least 18-pounders on the lower tier. What they had were mostly 4th and 5th rates with 12-pounders on the lower tier. What they wanted was to build 3rd rates, both larger and smaller (140-feet and 150-feet long). What was the plan was to build a small proportion of 3rd rates (two 150-feet and 20-136-feet) and a larger proportion of 4th rates (38 130-feet). What was actually build deviated from that, while several ships were purchased, beyond that plan.

The largest ships originally had a mixture of 18- and 24-pounders on the lower tier. The 4th rates still had 12-pounders. They also usually were equipped with the standard four 18- or 24-pounders, in addition.

Our thesis (perhaps against all logic) is still that broadside weight and ship size were more important than tactics. Our answer to Lowestoft is that there was so much political turmoil and dissention, along with too many merchant captains, that the battle was not a fair test of line tactics.

Also, our interpretation of the van de Velde panoramic battle drawings (from all three Anglo-Dutch Wars) is that what usually happened was a melee, after the opening encounters, at least at Lowestoft and the Third Dutch War battles. At best, you saw squadron warfare.

At the end of the 17th Century, with the triumph of formal tactics, naval warfare descended in the long period of stagnancy, until the Seven Years War. The wrong-headedness that started with the War of the English Succession and that was entrenched under Queen Anne meant that nothing interesting happened. Instead of winning battles, they were only interested in not losing them. What you had was conservative naval administration and conservative tactics. The new "book solution" was to fight in line, whether it made sense or not. If you didn't follow the book, and things didn't work out well, then there was serious trouble.

One of the goals of being able to list the combatants for both sides, in the First Dutch War, and having estimates (where there isn't real information available) for guns and dimensions, is to be able to test my thesis.

Tactics and control do matter. That is why Scheveningen was not as serious a loss as the Gabbard. The Vice-Admirals decided, after the Gabbard, that they wouldn't allow what Tromp let happen at the Gabbard. They were also ready to hang miscreants.

The Dutch losses at the Gabbard and Scheveningen were limited to hired and small ships, so they most serious losses were men and Maarten Tromp. Tromp was more of a symbolic loss, as the Orangists idolized him.

Admittedly, Witte de With came across as petty when it came to the rivalry with Tromp, but really the main source of animosity was that he was a rabid Republican. There was that and the fact that he was ready to hang anyone who wouldn't fight to the last shot. If the Dutch had followed his advice in late 1652, they would have spared themselves a lot of grief in 1653. It was only after the Gabbard that they started to court martial the slackers. It had started to be really noticeable as long before as the Kentish Knock. The Brederode was Witte de With's flagship for most of her life, except for the First Dutch War, but the pro-Tromp Orangists wouldn't let him on board.

He knew that he was up against very large English ships, as the Resolution (ex-Prince Royal) and Sovereign were present. The Brederode was smaller, but it was the best-armed ship present for the Dutch. Witte de With had to settle for the pretty unsatisfactory Indiaman, Prins Willem, which was 170 Amsterdam feet long. Herman Ketting gives her armament as 4-24pdr, 22-18pdr, 10-12pdr, and 6-8pdr. That was much better than the Prinses Louise, which had 2-24-pdr, 30-12pdr, and 4-5pdr. The Prinses Louise was about 400 tons, English. Admittedly, my English measurements are just estimates: 96ft x 28ft x 11ft.

We would like to know more about the relationship between Witte de With and Michiel De Ruyter. We only know superficial facts, at this point. In the fall of 1653, Witte de With commanded the active fleet and Michiel De Ruyter was effectively his lieutenant. De With flew his flag on the Huis te Zwieten while De Ruyter flew his on the Huis te Kruiningen. They had hoped to have them as their flagships at Scheveningen, but they weren't able to arm and man them in time.

The relationship became visible at the time of the Battle of the Kentish Knock, when De Ruyter joined the fleet with his 30 ships. About a third of them were so damaged as to be unfit for sea, so instead of 70 ships they only had about 59 ships for the Kentish Knock. The Dutch fleet mostly consisted of 5th rates or the equivalent, with a few 4th-rates. The Brederode was the only 3rd rate present. A few of the 4th-rates were large, but none had over 46 guns. There were the large Indiamen, but they only carried 40-45 guns.

We have a spreadsheet for the Dutch that will have all ships that participated on their side. Thanks to the information that Jan Glete pointed out, we now have a great deal more detailed information about the Dutch, albeit, only for the Directors' ships, and almost exclusively for the Amsterdam Directors' ships. We have extended the spreadsheet to cover the timeline for the war, with months and events noted. We want to be able to visually see checkmarks for all ships and captains at the battles and various events noted in the First Dutch War.

One set of resources that we have but have not tapped yet is Jan Evertsen and Pieter Florissen's journals. The reason that we have not more aggressively pursued them is that the copies are so poor. Mainly, it is because of the bindings and because the ink from the other side has bled through the original paper. Also, the handwriting is pretty bad.

Witte de With actually had pretty good handwriting, but we only have a journal for him for the latter 1640's. I also have some journals from Isaak Sweers from 1650 to late 1651 or early 1652, when he was with Johan van Galen in the Mediterranean. As we recall, the main reason that Joris van Cats (as they called him in the 1620's and 1630's) was the commander in the Mediterranean was the van Galen's health was poor, at that time. We have seen Cats characterized as a "Van Dorp-type", meaning that he was more of a politician than a naval commander. He did have a lot of experience, nonetheless. He just was much of a diplomat, as it was a diplomatic flap with the Duke of Tuscany that caused him to be relieved of his command.

Our belief is that what the Dutch built in late 1666 and in 1667 was an attempt to remedy the mismatch revealed to be still present at the St. James Day Battle. They built large 2nd rates and 3rd rates that caused them to be more competitive in the Third Dutch War. They didn't finish what they had planned but they put themselves in better shape. The Seignelay document (mentioned by Jan Glete in Navies and Nations) indicates that there were more ships than we have seen otherwise mentioned, such as a "Stork" (Ooievaar, or as Seignelay called her, La Cignone).