History of Warship Design

The conventional wisdom is that fighting in a single line of battle is a break-through tactic, and is superior to other tactics. This view was propagated by Julian S. Corbett, and others. In this century, this view was predominant, with no one to speak up to challenge the idea.

Not only has this view been held by students of naval history, but has also, at times, been the view held by senior naval officials. For example, at the Battle of Jutland, the British and German battle fleets were formed into single lines, at the initial encounter. You also saw, however, squadrons operating independently: the British Battle Cruiser Fleet and the German Scouting Force.

We will examine this issue from the Seventeenth Century to the end of World War II for evidence regarding the performance of the single line of battle versus other tactical systems. The competing tactical systems are often thought of as the unstructured melee, fighting by squadrons, either by squadrons in line, or squadrons en mass. For melee tactics, an important issue is whether there is any attempt to use concentration and mutual support.

Another factor on the viability of tactical systems is the numbers of ships involved. There is evidence, from the outcome of battles, that for small numbers, the single line is the most rational choice of formation. On the other hand, there is vast amounts of evidence to show that for large fleets, that fighting by squadrons, operating in support of each other, is a more rational choice than a long, single line. This is an issue that transcends time and technology. The main effect of time and technology is that the numbers that comprise a large fleet are fewer than in the Seventeenth Century.

The first war to be examined is The First Anglo-Dutch War. The last war of relevance is World War Two. The first battle to be examined will be the Battle of Dover, in the spring of 1652. The last battle to be examined is Surigao Strait, during the larger Battle of Leyte Gulf, in late 1944.

An interesting subtext of this examination is the effect of prestigious opinion on the discussion, especially since the 1890's. The work of analysts such as Julian S. Corbett and Brian Tunstall have stood, unchallenged, in their opinion that the single line of battle was the only viable tactical system, at least during the age of sail.

We hope to demonstrate here, that the signal successes of the last three hundred years were achieved outside of the model where there were two, fairly equally matched fleets, both in a single line of battle. In fact, there are numerous examples, especially in the first half of the Eighteenth Century, where battles fought in single lines of battles were indecisive. It was only in the mid-Eighteenth Century, where there was a new energy and system, and where admirals felt confident of being able to leave the line of battle and, by so doing, achieved significant victories.

The Battle of Jutland was a more recent example of a tactically drawn battle due to fighting in single lines. That the British felt that was the case is evident by the radical change that was made, after Admiral Beatty was made fleet commander, to fight in squadrons, not in a single line.

So, we will commence our examination of battles from the First Anglo-Dutch War up to and including World War II, looking for evidence about the performance of fleets using melee, single line of battle, and fighting by squadrons, either in line, or unorganized groups. We will be alert to see issues raised by changing technology, and the expanding gun range, starting in the mid-Nineteenth Century.